

Review Section

Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period, 1600-1868: Methods and Metaphors. Edited by Tetsuo Najita and Irwin Scheiner. University of Chicago Press. Chicago and London, 1978. xiii + 209 pp. \$18.50.

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Research in the field of intellectual history is first of all, and primarily, an attempt at communicating whatever may be communicable from the thinking of the past by the help of reliable methods. But too often, being dedicated to studies in Japanese thought means finding oneself exposed to no small difficulties of understanding. Naturally, this is particularly true of the scholar interested in comparative studies, for whom literature in Western languages is usually the only possible access; but it also applies in large measure to historians who write the history of Japanese thought itself. Once in a while they meet in order to talk to each other. Anyone who has ever taken part in such a meeting, in Japan or abroad, will probably have felt an inclination to view these group talks as attempts at the incommunicability of the communicable, or sometimes even at communicating the incommunicable. Too often, those of us working in this field deal with the language of the primary texts, with *ri* and *ki*, *kami* and *michi*, *sonnō* and *kokutai*, as if we knew what we are talking about. First, on the level of scholarly discourse, we elevate these ideas to analytical conceptions, and then we mix this terminology with the conceptual tools and metaphors of American and European forms of world perception, such as "rationality," "irrationality," "modernity," "traditionality," "bourgeoisie," and "the individual." Starting from that basis we attempt to constitute theories

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on "Japanese thought," by no means *sine ira et studio*, but following multiple motivations, of which we seldom render an account, and using methods of acquiring knowledge which mostly are not clarified. Thus the question soon becomes one of how to overcome this state of vagueness and hermetic subjectivity, and how we can reach a degree of communicability in our statements which will allow a meaningful exchange of experience.

The editors of this volume are not willing to settle for this current state of the art. They are of the refreshing opinion that "ideas are as concrete as visible institutions" (p. x). They view their task as "one of method, of shaping approaches, defining focuses, and formulating problems" (p. ix). They intend to "demystify the Tokugawa intellectual experience" (p. xi), and "to yield structural comparabilities" (p. xii) in order to lay the foundation for understanding beyond small circles of experts. On the volume being divided into two parts, the editors remark: "the first part concentrates on exploring method as a practical and flexible means of investigating more deeply text and conceptual patterns and metamorphoses within Tokugawa intellectual history. The second part, on the other hand, while not denying the previous view, poses questions about method as 'problem consciousness,' understanding Tokugawa history through an awareness of the crucial significance of that experience for Japanese politics and culture in modern times" (p. xiii). The authors appearing in the volume have, for the most part, distinguished themselves through numerous publications in the field of the history of thought of the Tokugawa period and of modern times; they include Tetsuo Najita and Harry D. Harootunian (Chicago), Irwin Scheiner and Robert N. Bellah (Berkeley), Niiyama Shigeki (Tsurumi University), Bitō Masahide, Sakai Yūkichi, and Matsumoto Sannosuke (University of Tokyo).¹

Tetsuo Najita's "Method and Analysis in the Conceptual Portrayal of Tokugawa Intellectual History" (pp. 3-38) is divided into a discussion of the methodological problems of analyzing political thought (pp. 3-23), and an attempt to apply his methodological principles to the thinking of Kaihō Seiryō (1755-1817) (pp. 23-36). The author is opposed to two predominant tendencies among Japanese historians (but not among their Western colleagues?): "In the former, the past is explained in terms of the needs of the present, and in the latter, the past is retold according to what it somehow ought to have been, which is to discuss it in terms of what it was

1. A second volume is planned under the same title, to be edited by Matsumoto Sannosuke and Harry D. Harootunian (see p. 101, note 18).

not" (p. 4). He outlines his own formulation of the question: "To avoid the pitfalls of historicism, two other basic questions come readily to mind. They ask *what*, or which thing, we are looking at, what its conceptual identity, quality, and meaning is, and *how* that thing is arranged as a self-reflective perception, as an entity possessing an inner structure and objective integrity of its own" (*ibid.*) He emphatically argues that questions concerning "who" and "why" are improper. Actually, only too often an attempt is made to answer questions concerning the "why" by postulating the significance of extratextual references with the help of psychological or sociological modes of explanation, when we have still by no means exhausted the possibilities that questions about the "what" and the "how," as well as the evidence that reliable primary texts and intratextual analysis have to offer us. On the other hand, we should also pay attention to the argument that our realization that no historical fact can be fully explained with the help of the causality principle must not lead us to a renunciation of this principle as a prerequisite for scientific explanation.² An amorphous conception of causality such as that advocated by Najita, who reduces the subtle problems of *causa* to the colloquial question "why," is bound to cause confusion. It is obvious that Najita's retreat to Popper's critique of historicism ties in with his understandable dislike for the ill-treatment of history by the advocates of modernization theory (cf. his p. xii).

Najita is opposed to the still prevailing model of "schools" as a means of classifying the thought of the Tokugawa period; rather, he advocates a hypotheses of "convergence" and "fusion." In "convergence," according to Najita, "disparate systems of thought come to share logically similar, if not identical, conceptual positions"; in "fusion," portions of differing systems of thought are actually collapsed and reordered into a new framework and dispersed to various parts of society" (pp. 13-14). Najita sees a tendency toward convergence mainly in the first half of the eighteenth century, and one toward eclectic fusion in the second half. For him, convergence seems to point toward establishing "central epistemological perspectives," and fusion toward explaining "concrete problems in a changing historical context" (p. 18). The coming into existence of "practical eclectic philosophy" has for him a close relationship to the phenomenon for which he introduces the "metaphorical hypothesis" of "moral crisis," and also to the decay of the idea of the natural legitimacy of the established order, together with the rise of

2. See Karl-Georg Faber, *Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Munich, 1974, 3rd ed.), p. 69f.

"empiricism," "ideological relativism," "functionalism," and "economic mercantilism" (p. 20ff.). Najita's presentation (pp. 3-23) relies partly on Kaibara Ekken, Dazai Shundai, and Yamagata Daini, with all of whom the author has dealt in earlier studies. But when he turns to other thinkers—Yamazaki Ansai, Satō Naokata, Yamaga Sokō, Inoue Kinga, Ninomiya Sontoku, *et al.*—he neither supports his statements with primary texts nor does he refer to the relevant secondary literature.³ With Kaiho Seiryō,⁴ the author fortunately turns to a thinker of whom Western Japanese studies have only marginally taken notice.⁵ But from the voluminous Japanese secondary literature Najita mentions only the volume published in the series *Nihon shisō taikai*, and the cursory statements by Maruyama Masao.⁶

Najita describes Kaiho, on the basis of the *Keiko dan* (1813), as a man of practical, eclectic thought, one who developed the political economy of Ogyū Sorai, Dazai Shundai, and others, into a tool for the money-bourgeoisie, and as an "empiricist," "materialist," and "rationalist" for whom the Confucian "heaven" as well as the notions of both Buddha and *kami* had become identical with the principle of measurability and calculability (*menokozan'yō*). This in turn was identical with *ri*, the basic principle both of nature and of social order (this last to be understood in a legalistic sense), but at the same time a principle now stripped of its ethical dimension as well as

3. For exceptions, see notes 7, 9, and 10 to pp. 9, 14f.

4. Najita and the other authors of this volume employ the unusual transcription "Kaihō." Saegusa Hiroto in *Chūō kōron* 53.2 (1938): p. 193, gives the readings "Kaibō" and "Unbo."

5. Apart from a short treatment of his thought with an excerpt translated from his late work the *Keiko dan* in Ryusaku Tsunoda et al., comps., *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 497-502, Kaiho has been studied in the still unpublished MA paper by Royall Tyler, *Lessons of the Past: The Social and Economic Thought of Kaiho Seiryō* (New York: Columbia University, 1966). See further Honjō Eijirō, "Economic Thought in the Latter Period of the Tokugawa Era," *Kyoto University Economic Review* 15.4 (1940), and "The Anti-Feudalistic Thought in the Tokugawa Period," *Bulletin of University of Osaka Prefecture, Series D, Sciences of Economy, Commerce and Law*, Vol. VII (1963). Najita does not cite these titles.

6. The most important literature is cited in Tsukatani Akihiro and Kuranami Seiji, comps., *Nihon shisō taikai*, Vol. 44 (Iwanami Shoten, 1970), pp. 505-7. Other articles of interest not cited there include Honjō Eijirō, *Shōkei gakuō* 27 (1964); Kobayashi Tamotsu, *Kōshiro* 10.5 (1944); Kondō Takeshi, *Kinjō gakuin daigaku ronsō* 14 (1959); Ozaki Hidetatsu, *Kyūshū shigaku* 8 (1958); Takase Shigeo, *Nihon bunkashi-ron*, published by the Shibata-sensei koki kinen-kai, 1977; Tanimura Ichitarō, *Kaga bunka* 15 (1966); and Watanabe Seiichi in *Rinrigaku nenpō* 9 (1960).

of its function as an instrument of political legitimization for the samurai elite. The phenomena of nature as well as relations within society find themselves being valued according to the utilitarian calculation of their exchange and commodity character (*urikaizan'yō*). Kaiho believed that, unlike the samurai, the bourgeoisie had succeeded in realizing that the accumulation of wealth was the appropriate form for social articulation at the time, and he regarded the hierarchical structure of society as an inadequate relic from an earlier period.⁷ Najita sees Kaiho's importance with regard to intellectual history in his reformulation of "political ideology into a new theory of society" (p. 35). At the same time he sees Kaiho's thinking as the expression of an "increasing tendency toward the interaction between abstract epistemological perspectives and concrete historical processes," and thus as a sign of "declining faith in the classical and moral past that came well before the impact of Western positivism" (p. 36).

Even if we should point out that Najita has not expanded our factual knowledge of Kaiho Seiryō beyond that of previous Japanese research, that he does not take into account the judgments of Japanese historical scholars,⁸ and that at times, in conformity to his own methodological approach, he does not mention interesting information,⁹ still one has to admit that here we have a contribution that is well argued and also brilliantly structured because of the author's knowledge of his subject matter. It should stimulate further studies from the methodological viewpoints of "convergence" and "fusion."

As recently as 1974 Ulrich Kemper noted, in regard to the peasant revolts of the Tokugawa period, that "the verbiage expended upon the subject" in Western Japanese studies has been "in inverse proportion to what is known about it."¹⁰ In the last ten years, as a

7. Cf. the critical remarks of Nomura Kentarō, "Kaiho Seiryō no keizairon," *Mita gakkai zasshi* 35.4 (1940): 48ff.

8. "The most unusual one among the economic theoreticians of the Tokugawa period" (Nomura Kentarō, 1940); "an enlightened absolutist" (Ozaki Hidetatsu, 1958); "a realist through and through," a thinker who mastered logic and the ability of abstract thought at a time when "the ability for abstract thought had not yet developed in the heads of the Japanese" (Saegusa Hiroto, 1938); "in a certain sense the most modern [thinker]" of the Tokugawa period (Yasumaru Yoshio, 1963).

9. As, for example, the significance of "Rangaku" in the work of the physician Katsuragawa Hoshū (1751-1809), whose role in the formation of the concept of *ri* on the part of Kaiho ought not, according to his own judgement in the *Tennō dan*, be overlooked.

10. "Zu den Bauernaufständen der ersten Meiji-Jahre (1868-1873)," *Ostasien-*

late reaction to the process of Japanese research in "the history of the people" (*minshūshi*) since the 1960s, a learning process seems to have occurred. Still, the gap is considerable; and one has to thank Irwin Scheiner all the more for having a survey of the problems of *minshū shisō* of the Edo period in his contribution "Benevolent Lords and Honorable Peasants: Rebellion and Peasant Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan" (pp. 39-62).

Scheiner first points out the degree to which the image of the peasant was determined in the past by non-scholarly motives. Thus, he promises an analysis on the basis of "folk legends about peasant rebels, peasant petitions to lord or shogun, and peasant religious pageants and celebrations" (p. 40), an attempt with very limited possibilities of realization within a short essay. Consequently, Scheiner makes special use of the Japanese secondary literature.¹¹ But while in the beginning he explains the problematic approaches of Marx, Lenin, Turgenev *et al.* to the image of the peasant, he does not attempt this in the case of his Japanese authors, with the exception of a short discussion of Sasaki Junnosuke. This, in the course of his presentation, leads to the result that some of the statements of the *minshūshi* authors, which were recently discussed by Carol Gluck, remain unaltered.¹²

Scheiner interprets the political consciousness of the peasants at the beginning of the Edo period with the help of the metaphor of "covenant" in the Old Testament sense of a "unilateral protection and unilaterally by the gracious act of the more powerful" (p. 45). In this context he places the notion of *jinsei* (benevolent reign) and *jinkun* (benevolent lord). The people have a right to a "benevolent," "solicitous" government and a legitimate claim to speak out if ideal and reality no longer coincide. Scheiner discovers this basic pattern in the Kabuki: "all these dramas demonstrate that peasants believed and acted *as if* they lived in a world of justice" (p. 50). Here one of Scheiner's problems in interpreting his primary texts emerges. The dramaturgic process does reflect conflicts; but on the whole, since it is intended for the entertainment of a wide audience,

wissenschaftliche Beiträge zur Sprache, Literatur, Geschichte, Geistesgeschichte, Wirtschaft, Politik und Geographie (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1974), p. 215.

11. Especially of Haga Noboru, Sasaki Junnosuke, Fukaya Katsumi, Yokoyama Toshio, Fukawa Kiyoshi and Yasumaru Yoshio; but less attention is paid to Irokawa Daikichi, and Gotō Sōichirō, Kano Masanao, Murakami Shigeyoshi, Saitō Hiroshi, Sakurai Tokutarō, and Takagi Shunsuke are not cited.

12. "People in History: Recent Trends in Japanese Historiography," *Journal of Asian Studies* 38.1 (1978).

it also has a tendency to neutralize conflicts into a harmonious picture of society. At the same time one should not deny the audiences' critical awareness of the attempt to harmonize these antagonisms against the background of their own social experiences. From this point of view the question arises whether Scheiner's form of argumentation had not better be replaced by a *conclusio ex negativo*.

A similar problem is apparent in the case of the petitions. Who were their authors? Certainly the members of a social group, represented by the village leaders (*shōya*), whose interests were at the point of intersection between the administrative hierarchy and the peasant population. The function of the *shōya* was, so to speak, to serve as an "interpreter" for the needs of his clientele. Even if he adopted Confucian political symbolism, it might be jumping to conclusions to presume that *jinkun* thought was generally predominant among the peasant population. *Jinsei, jinkun, seiri* (justice)—this was the language of the "covenant," which was employed to get the attention of superiors, because it was their language. But was it also the language of communication among the peasant farmers themselves?

Interesting results are obtained when Scheiner sees a causal connection between the development of the *yonaoshi* (world renewal) revolts and the growing economic alienation of village populations and village leaders. Here, that farmer who does not feel represented any more by the *shōya* suddenly seems to speak out (p. 58). This also seems to hint at the fact that the concept of "covenant" and the traditions expressed by the *yonaoshi* way of thought are forms of political articulation of different social strata. On the whole, Scheiner interprets the development of rural consciousness as a process of transforming the farmers "from objects requesting grace into subjects making their own justice" (p. 58). At the same time he emphasizes that the development did not lead to the formation of a "class antagonism" in the consciousness of the peasants, but to a "normative community which was breaking down all former ideas of social structure" and developing the ideal of a divine community of equality and brotherhood (p. 59)—with the peasants as the protagonists of political and social progress, of *liberté, égalité, and fraternité*? In any case, this is the gospel of the *minshūshi* history writing.

The basic hypothesis in Harry D. Harootunian's treatise "The Consciousness of Archaic Form in the New Realism of Kokugaku" (pp. 63–104) is that *kokugaku* was an attempt to establish a "more realistic language that might accommodate changes which conven-

tional [Neo-Confucian, K.K.] language could not name" (p. 65). Harootunian is concerned with the modalities of this process. First, he deals with the basic methodological questions of intellectual history (pp. 63-76), introducing concepts from structuralism, including the theory of discontinuity, the theory of tropes, and the hypothesis of homology between the text-structure and the world-view of a given social group. One who is not familiar with the authors mentioned (Michel Foucault, Lucien Goldman, Kenneth Burke, Hayden White *et al.*) might be hard pressed by Harootunian's idiochromatic language; at any rate, it is generally adequate to Foucault's poetry of scholarship, which, in turn, motivated Hayden White to write his witty contribution *Foucault Decoded*.¹³ But once these difficulties have been accepted, one will find, in the course of the contribution, an intelligent, interpretive approach to the origin of the "new discourse" of the *kokugaku* (pp. 76-84), and in the chapters "Archaism" (pp. 84-89) and "Cosmological History" (pp. 89-99) a rich and stimulating analysis of the changes transpiring between Motoori Norinaga and Hirata Atsutane. These chapters do not broaden our present scope of knowledge concerning *kokugaku* but, on the other hand, they also do not fall below the level of previous knowledge, despite their disregard for the relevant literature,¹⁴ a technique that is also significant in Foucault's research style.

We will have to limit ourselves to a few remarks. (1) Harootunian believes the foundations of the "new discourse" were laid by Motoori Norinaga. Why not by Watarai Nobuyoshi or Yoshikawa Koretari, or Keichū or Kamo Mabuchi, just to mention a few possibilities? (2) Harootunian is generalizing when he talks of "Neo-Confucianism." Does he mean *e.g.* the Neo-Confucianism of Chu Hsi? A common denominator of the mentalities of Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming? Japanese Shushigaku? And if he does, which of its tendencies? A common denominator of Japanese Shushigaku and Yōmeigaku? The entity that Japanese critics, ancient and modern,

13. "Foucault Decoded: Notes from the Underground," *History and Theory* 12 (1973); see also the irreverent but informative article by George Huppert, "Divinatio et Eruditio: Thoughts on Foucault," *History and Theory* 13 (1974).

14. From among the more than sixty papers and monographs in Western languages that are devoted to *Kokugaku*, Harootunian cites only the excellent study of Motoori by Shigeru Matsumoto (1970) and an introductory paper by Tahara Tsuguo (1973). From the Japanese-language secondary literature Harootunian employs the posthumously published studies of Muraoka Tsunetsugu on Motoori and Hirata (1957), as well as Koyasu Nobukuni (1972) and Tahara (1964). For an introduction to the standard literature on the subject, see Haga Noboru, *Kinseishi handobukku* (Kondō Shuppansha, 1974, 2nd edition), pp. 240-43.

have regarded as "Japanese Shushigaku"? Harootunian does not comment on any of this. This is all the more serious because he is contrasting the origin of the "new discourse" with the "old discourse" of "Neo-Confucianism." Harootunian is not alone in this problem. Part of the methodology of numerous studies in the intellectual history of the Tokugawa period (including this volume) is to contrast the formation of new elements and thought structures with a monochromatic notion of "Shushigaku" or even of "Neo-Confucianism." If one made an attempt at concretizing the amorphous image of Neo-Confucianism, this would not, simply and without further ado, result in a simplified contrast of "Neo-Confucianism" with "nativism," as for example the case of the Hayashi Razan of the *Shintō denju* (1644) may illustrate.¹⁵ (3) The problematic tendency toward a contrastive analysis is also revealed through the juxtaposition of Motoori and Hirata: "structure" vs. "process," "historyless concealment" vs. "meaning in history," "privatization" vs. "public performance," "emotionality" or "interiority" vs. "practical activity," "acceptance" vs. "responsibility," and "particular things" vs. "a whole." (4) What now are the structural equivalents in the non-discursive social realm? What societal facts correspond to the formation of the new discourse, if it is really "new"? Here Harootunian laconically points to the changing of "pressures of external history" (pp. 89, 98). On the other hand, he mentions an "inner dialectic" and a "structure of procedure" in *kokugaku* (p. 90). All in all, a multitude of thought-provoking and original speculations.

It is regrettable that we must object to the quality of Harootunian's textual understanding in more than one respect. Because this is also a problem of numerous publications in the field of the history of thought other than Harootunian's, the author is likely to forgive us, if we cite two paragraphs from Hirata Atsutane's *Tama no mihashira* (1812) which he has translated. The passages which must be regarded as questionable in Harootunian's version are to be found in italics in the Japanese text and in my own version. My text is from the edition in the *Nihon shisō taikai*, Vol. 50, p. 13 and p. 103f., which is also the text used by Harootunian (p. 93f.):

Sumera no mikuni is the august country and supporting foundations
of all other countries, that it excels all countries in all things as to

15. See Lydia Brüll, "Prinzip (*ri*) und Materie (*ki*). Ein Beitrag zur Metaphysik des Hayashi Razan," in the *Jahrbuch* of the Japanisches Kulturinstitut (Cologne, 1970), p. 16f.; also, Takahashi Miyuki, "Hayashi Razan no Shintō shisō," *Nihon shisōshi* 5 (1977).

inspire awe and obedience. Because our country has known the true principle it sits as the Great Lord (*ōkimi*) of the 10,000 countries. For this reason we should understand the whereabouts of the spirits.

Text:

*mata waga Sumera Ōmikuni wa,
yorozu no kuni no, moto tsu
mihashira taru mikuni ni shite,
yorozu no mono yorozu no koto
no, yorozu no kuni ni suguretaru
moto no iware, mata kakemaku
mo kashikoki, waga sumera
mikoto wa, yorozu no kuni no,
ōkimi ni mashimasu koto no,
makoto no kotowari wo umara
ni shiriete, nochi ni tama (Sinoj.
kon) no yukue wa shirubeki
mono ni namu arikeru. . . .*

My version:

*and after we have fully learnt
both the fundamental reason
why our Great Venerable
Country of the Lord is the
venerable country which is the
venerable foundation pillar of all
countries, and in all things and
all matters excels all countries,
and [learnt] as well the true
principle according to which, as
I humble being dare say, our
awe-inspiring lord resides as the
Great Lord of all countries, we
can indeed understand the
whereabouts of the spirits. . . .*

Here the major problems with the Harootunian version include the following points: (1) He has taken no notice of the overall syntactic structuring of the passage, and hence misses the sense of the construction that hinges upon . . . *moto no iware, mata. . . makoto no kotowari wo . . . shiriete, nochi ni . . . shirubeki mono ni namu arikeru.* (2) . . . *kashikoki* has been taken incorrectly from the point of view of syntax, and also misunderstood lexically. (3) Numerous important words and expressions have simply been left out: *mata, waga, ō(mikuni), mi(hashira), yorozu no koto, moto no iware, kakemaku mo, umara ni, namu . . . -keru.* (4) *sumera mikoto* has somehow become 'country.'

The reason human spirits (*hito no tama*) do not migrate to *yomi* is known not only from the real facts of the age of the gods, but also we can understand this by an examination of the reasons why people are born and what happens to them after death. To begin with even though people are born as bestowed things of parents, the basic cause of their creation is the mysterious and marvelous creative powers of the gods, who have produced the four materials (*yokusa*) in man of wind and fire, water and earth and, blessing people with a spirit (*tamashii*), gave them birth. At death, water and earth become a corpse (*nakigara*) since we see its remains before us; we can see the fact that the spirit (*tama*), together with wind and fire, are set free. . . . The reason for this is because wind and fire correspond to

heaven, while earth and water belong to the soil. (Harootunian, p. 94f.)

Nao iwaba, hito no tama (Sinoj. jinkon) no, *subete wa*, Yomi ni *yukumajiki* ri wa, kamiyo no koto no jitsu ni yorite shiru nomi narazu, hito no umareizuru yueyoshi, *mata* shinite nochi no koto no jitsu wo mite mo *satorubeki wa*, mazu hito no umareizuru koto wa, chichihaha no tamamono naredomo, sono *nariizuru* moto wa, *kami no musubi* no, kusushiku taenaru *mitama* ni yorite, kaze to hi to mizu to tsuchi, *yokusa no mono* wo musubinashitamai, *sore ni tamashii* (Sinoj. shinkon) wo sachiwaikumarite, *umareshimetamau* koto naru wo, . . . shinite wa, mizu to tsuchi to wa nakigara to narite arawa ni nokoriaru wo *mireba*, *tama* (Sinoj. shinkon) wa kaze to hi to ni, taguite, *sakarizaru* koto to mietari . . . Ko wa, kaze to hi to wa ame ni *tsuki*, tsuchi to mizu wa tsuchi ni *tsukubeki* kotowari no aru ni yorite *narubeshi*.

Moreover, [speaking of] the principle according to which all human spirits cannot go to Yomi, we not only learn it from the real facts of the age of the gods; what we also can understand, by examining [with our eyes] the reasons why man is born as well as the real facts after death, is above all that, even though man's birth is a bestowed thing of his father and mother, the basic cause of his coming into existence is the mysterious and marvelous venerable power of the gods' creative action, which, by producing the four kinds of materials—wind and fire, water and earth—and, in addition to this, blessing [man] with a spirit of the heart, deign to give him birth . . . , while at death, when water and earth become a corpse and we see its remains before us, the fact is manifest [to our eyes] that the divine spirit [of man], together with wind and fire, is getting away . . . The reason for this, I think, is that there exists the principle according to which wind and fire must belong to Heaven, and earth and water must belong to the Earth.

Again, we can only point out the major problems in the Harootunian version: (1) While the essentials of Hirata's argument have survived here more correctly than in the above example, still the passage is marred by the author's missing the logical relationships indicated by *satorubeki wa* and *naru wo*, by misunderstanding the syntactical function of *mireba*, and by overlooking the correlation between *to narite* and *mireba*. (2) The modal suffixes *-majiki*, *-beki*, and *-beshi* are ignored. (3) The endoactive verbs *nariizuru*,

sakarisaru, and *mietari* are erroneously taken as exoactive. (4) *tamashii* (written with Sino-Japanese *shinkon*, Morohashi 10295.158), and *tama* (Sino-Japanese *shinkon*, Morohashi 24673.204), are both, together with *tama* (written with Sino-Japanese *kon*, Morohashi 45787) in the previous text, rendered as 'spirit(s).' (5) *nao iwaba, no, subete wa, mata, sore ni* have been left out. (6) A textual omission is not indicated, following . . . *umareshimetamau koto naru wo*. Differences of opinion about certain critical points are always possible. But there should be agreement that in the case of philosophically oriented texts only that translation will be helpful—in the sense of contributing to the acquisition of significant knowledge—which recreates the individual features, the structural logic (or illogic), and the semantic nuances of the original. With such texts, aesthetic features may be considered as of secondary importance compared to these other factors.

With exhaustive citations of Saussure and numerous examples of changes in the meaning of nouns and verbs, illustrated from the 1867 and 1887 editions of James C. Hepburn's *A Japanese and English Dictionary*, Niiyama Shigeki's contribution "Saussure's Linguistic Theories and the Study of Japanese Intellectual History" (pp. 105–33) sets out on a search for the inner linguistic structure of Japanese which made feasible the adjustments toward new ideas and concepts of the Meiji period. The reviewer does not feel fully competent to comment on the purely linguistic aspects of this chapter; but in general terms it is clear that a more serious emphasis by Niiyama on precision in relation to the specific requirements of *shisōshi* studies would have been desirable. Indeed, it is particularly from the approach of historical semantics that one might hope for an important impetus that would help to render *shisōshi* studies more and more concrete; but such an impetus is lacking here. Furthermore, as one of the common factors that connect all the authors represented in this volume with the more general problem of *shisōshi*, one might point out their low degree of consciousness concerning the history of concepts and argumentation. Progress in this area can hardly be expected, so long as no beginning is made to a discussion of these problems in the specific terms of Japanese studies.

In his study "Baigan and Sorai: Continuities and Discontinuities in Eighteenth-Century Japanese Thought" (pp. 137–152), Robert N. Bellah attempts a new approach by going back to the beginnings of his interest in the intellectual history of the Tokugawa period. He summarizes a decisive extension of his earlier understanding of Western modernity with the following statement: "The radical

break, not only with the Christian religion, but with classical philosophy, came not with Protestantism but with modern philosophy" (p. 138).¹⁶ He reconstructs fundamental consciousness patterns with a contrastive representation of the beliefs about human nature (*sei*) held by Baigan and Sorai, on the basis of the *Seiri mondō* chapter in the *Tohi mondō* (1739), and of the *Bendō* (1717). He labels these patterns "symbolic consciousness"¹⁷ and "conceptual consciousness."¹⁸ Again, difficulties in pursuing modernity problems are visible here when Bellah, commenting on Sorai with the texts of the *Bendō* and *Bemmei* (1717) in mind, states that he, "we might almost say single-handedly, created 'modern philosophy' in Japan" (p. 139).

There is hardly any doubt that "conceptual consciousness" is a phenomenon representing one of the essential characteristics of man in the modern Western world. Applied to European history, this

16. "... particularly the line that goes from Machiavelli through Hobbes and Locke, to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century utilitarians" (p. 138). For the modification of Bellah's concept of "modernization" in his *Tokugawa Religion* (1957) see Maruyama's review in *Kokka gakkai zasshi*, April, 1958, reprinted in R. N. Bellah, *Nihon kindai no shūkyō rinri*, *Nihon kinsei shūkyō ron* (Miraisha, 1966), pp. 321-54; cf. also Ishida Takeshi's remarks in R. N. Bellah, *Shakai henkaku to shūkyō rinri* (Miraisha, 1973), pp. 382ff. The change in Bellah's view of modernity can be traced beginning with his articles "Religious Tradition and Historical Change," *Transactions of the Institute of Japanese Culture and Classics* (Kokugakuin University), No. 8 (1961); "Nihon kindai no ayumi," *Daihōrin* 28 (1961); and "Values and Social Change in Modern Japan," *Asian Cultural Studies* (International Christian University), No. 3 (1963). Of lasting interest remains Bellah's "Reflections on the Protestant Ethic Analogy in Asia," *Journal of Social Issues* 19 (1963). For critical remarks on this article cf. Arnold Zingerle, *Max Weber und China. Herrschafts- und religionssoziologische Grundlagen zum Wandel der chinesischen Gesellschaft* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1972), esp. pp. 115-17.

17. "Symbolic consciousness always tries to transcend the subject/object dichotomy and its symbols seek to express a level of reality that is neither subjective nor objective but includes both in immediate perception. . . . Symbolic consciousness is always concerned with correlating inner states and outer realities, with a discipline of experience rather than a mere accumulation of external knowledge unintegrated with a total life space. . . . Through refining our symbolic consciousness we discipline the self and organize action" (p. 143f.).

18. "Conceptual consciousness is above all based on the differentiation of subject and object. Its aim is clear and distinct ideas about objective reality with as little contamination from subjectivity as possible. . . . Conceptual consciousness wishes to construct a vocabulary and syntax to deal with the exteriority of things, uncontaminated with concerns about inner states and feelings. . . . Through developing our conceptual consciousness we enormously enhance our capacity to manipulate the world. . . . Nonetheless the hypertrophy of conceptual consciousness is a characteristic of modern philosophy in both East and West" (p. 143f.).

phenomenon has been studied from distinctively different angles and has been labeled in very different ways. Bernard Willms, for one, has established the conception of "poietic subjectivism," which, together with the autonomy of the civil subject and possessive individualism, may well constitute a triple determination of the modern civil individual.¹⁹ But Willms's description of the phenomenon brings out an essential difference between the Sorai context of tradition and modern Western thought. While the phenomenon of dichotomizing the world into subject and object is present in both cases, the "subjects" differ in the ways in which they want to shape the "object." Sorai's subject is subject in a different sense from what we know it to be in Western tradition, where the underlying understanding of the world is paradigmatically visible in Marx's view that the Christian god represents a projection of the best in man, a notion that, as Eric Voegelin has elaborated, actually includes the idea that it is the aim of societal action for man to regain his image of himself when he realizes that he himself is god.²⁰

Obviously, the modern Western notion of man as the creative individual in history can be traced back to the Christian notion of God as creator. Thus, we must also clarify the consequences of the notion of deity in the case of the Japanese tradition.²¹ But on the basis of our previous knowledge we may articulate the hypothesis that the non-existence of a creator-deity as central to the definition of religious consciousness does not, even given the permanent secularization of thought, suggest the postulation of a concept analogous to that of the modern Western idea of man as "creator" of his own world.²² In other words, we have to deal not only with the

19. *Die politischen Ideen von Hobbes bis Ho Tschih Minh* (Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne, Mainz: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1971), pp. 15-22. For Willms's definition of poietic subjectivism, see his p. 21 (the passage may be translated as follows: "All 'motions,' i.e. all arrangements, all human acts are conceived to have their basis in nothing else than the autonomous individual, and man is the sole subject of the world, i.e. he defines all reality apart from himself with himself as the subject, while positing this reality that confronts him as the object. . . . Poietic subjectivism denotes that element of modern consciousness, which regards the world, right down to its very categories, as a challenge for subjective creation.").

20. *Die Neue Wissenschaft der Politik. Eine Einführung* (Munich: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1959), p. 177.

21. Bitō Masahide has taken note of this necessity in his after-word to the new edition of Nagata Hiroshi, *Nihon hōkensei ideorogii* (Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1968), p. 274. Cf. also Bellah's "Father and Son in Christianity and Confucianism," *Psychoanalytic Review* 52 (1965).

22. See, to the contrary view, Wing-tsit Chan, *Journal of Asian Studies* 38.1 (1978), p. 174, answering Julia Ching (1977).

"conceptual consciousness," but also with the self-understanding, the "intrastructure" of the subject that postulates the concepts. Mentioning the "unbridled subjectivity" (p. 144) that can be found in modern Western thought, as well as in Sorai, will not be sufficient. Furthermore, "conceptual consciousness" is realized through the medium of time. The problem of the dimension of time over which change may be understood is just as important as the further question of whether change in time as an on-going linear-ascendant process is conceivable for secular thought out of the indigenous conceptual world of religious tradition.²³ From this perspective, any postulation of an endogenesis for modern thought in Japanese intellectual history remains questionable, while the application of the categories "modern" or "early modern" to the time periods before the intrusion of Western thought structures seems increasingly problematic with regard to the evaluation of traditional Japanese thought. The question remains to be answered of whether or not we should go as far in our critique as to recognize in Bellah's interpretation of Sorai primarily the expression of a well-known viewpoint that has fallen prey to the fascination of world history as a symmetrical event; a form of understanding that furthermore tends to interpret all historical change outside America and Europe as pointing to a *telos*, an "end" that has already been anticipated in the experience of Western culture.

Concerning the other questions raised by Bellah's arguments, the personalization of "conceptual" and "symbolic consciousness" should also be mentioned. It is visible in statements like "nothing was ever the same again after Sorai" (p. 139), and "Baigan's heritage has also been at work in the last two centuries" (p. 148). Here a point of view is articulated that has the tendency to regard highly the position of the "great thinker" in comparison with the intellectual climate of his time, and to interpret that which after him developed in a comparable shape in the sense of a genetic relationship. For this reason also, it is problematic that Bellah sets up a connection between the so-called "certain scholar" in the *Tohi mondō* and the school of Sorai (p. 139f.), and thus undertakes a speculation for which Sorai and Baigan studies do not provide any facts whatsoever. Were Sorai and his followers the only ones who, at the time of Baigan, developed skepticism or agnosticism regarding the

23. See my paper "Zur Problematik der Endogenese von Modernität in der japanischen Geschichte. Einige Überlegungen unter Berücksichtigung der Struktur der Zeitbegriffe," in Fritz Opitz and Roland Schneider, eds., *Referate des IV. Deutschen Japanologentags in Tübingen* (MOAG, LXXIII, Hamburg, 1978).

metaphysics of the Shushigaku? Not at all, as we know. It is also regrettable that Bellah did not deal explicitly with the Japanese Sorai controversy,²⁴ except cursorily mentioning Maruyama (1952), who cannot be disregarded for the sake of the authors' own development.²⁵ We miss the inclusion of the newer Shingaku literature,²⁶ and at times, Bellah's handling of primary texts is problematic. Thus, questions must be asked when the celebrated passage *i yin i yang chih wei tao* from the *I-ching* (Baigan's *ichi'in ichiyō kore wo michi to iu*) becomes, in Bellah's version, "Yin and Yang are called the Way" (p. 141); or when an erroneous citation of Baigan's original²⁷ leads Bellah to a questionable English version, as in the passage [*Kono futatsu wo tsugu mono wo kentoku sureba*], *katachi naki mono ni shite banbutsu no tai to naru mono nari*, where Bellah has omitted the portion of the text in brackets above, and hence translates, "Forms disappear and there is only the essence of the ten thousand things" (p. 142). Correctly read, the passage should be understood as "When we look at what connects (= is the common basis of) both these [we see] that it has no form and that it is the essence of all things." By "both these" the passage refers to man's "outer breath" (*ko*) and "inner breath" (*kyū*), mentioned earlier in the text; what "connects" (*tsugu*) these two is "matter" (*ki*). Hence the sense of the passage actually is, "Matter has no form, it is the essence of all things."

Bitō Masahide's contribution "Ogyū Sorai and the Distinguishing Features of Japanese Confucianism" (pp. 153–160) is closely tied to Yoshikawa Kōjirō's *Minzokushugisha to shite no Sorai*,²⁸ in which the latter dealt with the reproach of "un-Japanese" thinking,

24. References to the Western-language and newer Japanese literature are to be found now in *Acta Orientalia* 40 (1979):253–67.

25. See Bellah's new evaluation of *Nihon seiji shisōshi kenkyū* in *Journal of Japanese Studies* 3 (1977): 177–83.

26. Apart from his own work (1957), Bellah cites Paolo Beonio-Brocchieri (1961, 1967), and Ishikawa Ken's standard work on the *Tohi mondō* (1968). A survey of the significant literature will be found in *Nihon shisō taikai*, Vol. 42; see also the *Kinseishi handobukku* (cited in note 14 *supra*), p. 349f. For works in Western language see *Ostasienswissenschaftliche Beiträge* (cited note 10 *supra*), p. 319f. Further, the study by Jennifer Robertson, "Rooting the Pine: Shingaku Methods of Organization," *Monumenta Nipponica* 34.3 (1979) is to be cited as representative of the most recent contribution.

27. *Ishida Baigan zenshū*, Vol. 1, p. 102.

28. First printed in *Sekai* (January, 1974); later reprinted in Yoshikawa Kōjirō, *Jinsai, Sorai, Norinaga* (Iwanami Shoten, 1975), pp. 201–42. For an essential evaluation of Yoshikawa's studies on Sorai, see further Bitō's discussion with Katō Shūichi and Ueyama Shunpei in *Shisō* 608 (1975).

of which Sorai has often been accused, even today. Bitō confirms Yoshikawa's statements and expands them from the political point of view. Bitō's contribution partly overlaps his essay *Kokkashugi no sokei to shite no Sorai*,²⁹ where he examines Maruyama's evaluation of Sorai with particular attention to the "modernity content" (*kindaisei*). Bitō's focus is on the political aspect of the Sorai religiosity, the concept of worshipping Heaven and the ancestors. He shows how Sorai's "arbitrary method of citation" (p. 157) leads away from the ideas of classical Confucianism insofar as he attributes a central value to religious momentum. The aim of this manipulation is seen as the establishment of a functional ideology corresponding to the aims of the political system (p. 158); and the same is also true of the special emphasis on the indigenous tradition of the "Way." While for Confucius and Mencius the cultivable individual is at the center, and "Neo-Confucianism" is concerned with the idea "that people are to be educated to rule themselves," Sorai appears to have conceived of the individual only as a part of a group. The topic of his reflections are "the larger collective," and his central problem is "how best to manage the masses." Thus it is Sorai's conception of man "which best reflects Japanese social consciousness" (p. 159).

In the above-mentioned essay dating from 1974, more clearly than here, Bitō points out what he regards as the "distinctly Japanese character" of social consciousness: the interpretation of the individual's role as a being that has to play its part within the given system of order. He states that there exists the autonomy of the individual within society, but no autonomy in front of society.³⁰ In this respect Bitō presents Sorai as a counterposition to Shushigaku, which he sees as the representative of the alleged "modern" values of individualism and rationalism, exemplified, according to Bitō's view, in Arai Hakuseki. While in Western culture the "two sides of modernization" (*kindaika no futatsu no sokumen*) had developed hand in hand—the dichotomization of nature and society as well as the development of individualism and rationalism—in Japan the two had a contrasting relationship.³¹

Aside from the already mentioned doubts concerning "modernity," one tends to accept Bitō's statements, which reveal an intellectual's stance of actual engagement, about the political character of Sorai's thought. And the thesis of the "Japanization" (*Nihonka*)

29. In Bitō Masahide, ed., *Nihon no meicho*, Vol. 16 (Chūō Kōronsha, 1974).

30. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 60f.

of Confucianism is interesting, even if it is not accepted by all Sorai interpreters. A society where one day the idea of the autonomy of the civil subject prevailed, would, according to Bitō, be a better, but in a certain sense, also an "un-Japanese" society.

In his contribution "The Constitutionalism of Inoue Kowashi" (pp. 161-180), Sakai Yūkichi resumes the topic of his 1977 study *Meiji kenpō kiso katei ni okeru "futatsu no rikkenshugi,"*³² where he examined the "dual character" and the "ambiguity" of the Meiji constitution. He demands of future studies that they lay open the intellectual roots of the Meiji constitution, even those to be found in pre-Western thought.³³ Since the end of the last century a very considerable number of publications have been written on Inoue Kowashi as a politician. However, Sakai has been the first to attempt a broad primary text analysis of the pre-Western intellectual background of this political thinker.³⁴

First the author describes Inoue's political consciousness during the Bakumatsu period, pointing out that the all-encompassing interests of the young intellectual were based on the preservation of Japan's national independence. He locates the practical eclecticism of the early Inoue within the framework of fundamental Chu Hsi conceptions. With a description of Inoue's political ideas at the beginning of his public effectiveness, Sakai points out the continuity of his thinking, at the heart of which the idea of the "national entity" (*kokutai*) was located as the central reference category. The ambivalent position of the Tennō becomes clear in Inoue's notion that "ultimately the emperor's words and deeds will coincide naturally

32. *Kokka gakkai zasshi* 90.9-10 (1977).

33. *Ibid.*, p. 68f.

34. To be sure, an attempt to reach an adequate understanding of the Meiji Constitution and also of the "Rescript on Education" through clarifying the "system" and the "structure" of Inoue's thought in terms of his own indigenous assumptions has been undertaken in a study not cited by the author, Umetani Noboru, "Inoue Kowashi no shisōteki seikaku," *Shirin* 34.3 (1960); but Umetani himself had to rely upon Inoue's *Jukyō wo sonsu* (1886) because of the still unsatisfactory situation with respect to published primary sources. Nevertheless, there have also been worthwhile publications since 1945: Fujita Tsuguo, *Nihon gakushi'in kiyō* 12.2 (1954); Hosoya Toshio, *Monbu jihō* 1022 (1962); Inoue Hisao, *Kyōikugaku kenkyū kiyō* 1 (1956); Kaigo Tokiomi, *Nihon* 8.4 (1965); Inoue Hisao, ed., *Inoue Kowashi no kyōiku seisaku* (Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1968); Kamishima Jirō, *Nihon no shisōka*, Vol. 1 (Asahi Shinbunsha, 1962); Joseph Pittau, *Monumenta Nipponica* 20 (1965), together with the Japanese version of this article in *Sofia* 15.2 and 15.3 (1966); Joseph Pittau, *Political Thought in Early Meiji Japan, 1868-1889* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), *passim.*; Tanaka Sōgorō, *Nihon jinbutsushi taikai*, Vol. 5 (Asakura Shoten, 1960); and Yokoyama Haruo, *Kokugakuin zasshi* 65.5 (1964).

with the law" (p. 175), as does also the equation fundamental to this notion, in which rule by law = rule by "principle" (*ri*) = rule by the "Way" (*michi*) = conservation of *kokutai* = rule by the Tennō. There is no proper place for pluralism or conflict in Inoue's world view. In this way, Sakai arrives at an explanation for the preference for Prussian constitutionalism within the context of pre-Western Japanese thought.

The author speculates cautiously on the significance of the late Mito school for Inoue: "there is little evidence that Inoue studied Mitogaku directly during the Bakumatsu period. Thus it is also possible that he and the Mito scholars may have arrived at similar conclusions by different routes" (p. 177f., note 12). Certainly such a process of independently occurring convergence is basically possible. Still, we may certainly also assume that any educated samurai of the Bakumatsu period was familiar with the general principles of the Mito school. Did Inoue never have contact with, at the very least, Aizawa Seishisai's *Shinron*, copies of which circulated in the vassal territories from 1825 on, and which also appeared in print in 1857? Furthermore, we know that he associated with such scholars as Yokoi Shōnan, who once had a close relationship with Fujita Tōko, and who shared the views of the Mito school until the early fifties and "never threw off Mito influence"³⁵ even after his intellectual reorientation, as Harootunian has shown; surely then we are justified in framing a hypothesis of influence by the Mito school on Inoue. Congruencies in the spheres of symbol, style of thought, and topics all speak in support of such a view.^{35a}

In his contribution "The Idea of Heaven: A Tokugawa Foundation for Natural Rights Theory" (pp. 181-199) Matsumoto Sanosuke presents two juxtaposed positions of the early Meiji period with regard to natural law, through the characters of Katō Hiroyuki and Ōi Kentarō on the one hand, and Nakae Chōmin and Ueki Emori on the other. While the former viewed the "natural desires" of man as basically hostile to society, and as something that might be realized as human rights only in connection with moral and ethical limitations (p. 182), the latter were of the opinion that "natural

35. *Toward Restoration. The Growth of Political Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1970), p. 324.

35a. After finishing his manuscript the reviewer received an article written by Sakai, "Bakumatsu seinenki no Inoue Kowashi. Sono seiji ishiki wo meguru ichi kōsatsu," in Konishi Shirō and Tōyama Shigeki, eds., *Meiji kokka no kenryoku to shisō* (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1979), pp. 1-62. Sakai writes there in a more detailed approach on problems which he has discussed in the present article. He especially concentrates on Inoue's talks with Yokoi Shōnan and Inoue's *Kōeki ron*.

desires to maintain life and pursue happiness are good in themselves" (p. 183f). The author attempts to pursue both positions with regard to their "foundations" within the thought of the Tokugawa period. Matsumoto shows how, in the debate carried on by Jinsai and Sorai, two fundamentally different understandings of the political role of the people were developed in relation to the interpretation of heaven. Sorai's idea of heaven as "indefinable and unknowable," a "transcendental" and "mystical, absolute entity" with the qualities of "super-eminence" and "personal character" aims at "the independence of ruler's conduct" (p. 196), the characterization of a ruler who understands his function as one of securing the "true well-being of the people" (*anmin*) via creative actions (p. 193). According to Matsumoto, Sorai viewed the people as a vegetative element whose only concern was with the preservation of its own life, and with the "private sphere" (*shi*) (p. 195f). Their political articulation had to take the form of support for the ruler in his "public" efforts. Matsumoto discovers in this point of view not only a forerunner of the conceptions of Katō Hiroyuki and Ōi Kentarō, but also "the pattern of 'assistance' (*yokusangata*) later found to be characteristic of Japanese political participation" (p. 196). On the other hand, Matsumoto regards Itō Jinsai's conception of heaven as a "living entity" (*katsubutsu*) as a "noteworthy antecedent in Tokugawa thought for the concepts of individual rights which appeared in early Meiji theories of natural rights" (*ibid.*).

This contribution employs certain ideas earlier found in Matsumoto's *Nihon seiji shisōshi gairon*,³⁶ where the author gave an account of the development of Japanese political thought from the seventeenth century to the 1880s as "one stream of thought."³⁷ Like his teacher Maruyama Masao, Matsumoto is one of the few scholars who are well acquainted with the thought of the Tokugawa period as well as with that of modern times—a fundamental precondition for a distinctive style of approach rarely found in Japanese research. Matsumoto develops his view basically from the position of the intellectual who is directly affected by contemporary problems. Matsumoto shows himself related to Maruyama in this respect, as well as in regard to the teleological perspective that he adapts toward the object of his studies.³⁸

The separation of the particular and the general is often one of

36. Keisō Shobō, 1975.

37. *Loc. cit.*, p. 198.

38. On Matsumoto's evaluation of Maruyama, see his discussion with Imai Jūichirō, Yasuda Takeshi and Andō Jinbē in *Gendai no riron*, May, 1972.

the typical difficulties of *shisōshi* literature. The same holds true for the presentation in question. In relation to *ikioi*, Matsumoto speaks of "the irrational idea of 'momentum'" (p. 188), an argument which, as a generalization, is questionable, let alone his basically problematic use of the categories "rational" and "irrational."³⁹ The same problem surfaces when he talks of Sokō's notion of *tenmei* (heavenly mandate) (p. 188). The question is whether this special emphasis on Sokō does not disregard the fact that here we simply have a constant factor in the consciousness of the Confucian intellectual. Again, a similar instance is found in Matsumoto's statement on the significance of heaven as "a source of unlimited energy for all creation" (p. 191). This conception was neither specifically Jinsai's nor a special feature of his Kogaku thought.⁴⁰

As we continue to consider the question of just how communicable studies on Japanese thought may or may not have become, particularly in the light of this new contribution to the field, it might not be out of place to list some of the major *desiderata* of this field as it stands today:

(1) Respect for the language of the texts must be both the starting point and the subsequent basis for any acquisition of knowledge through study of intellectual history. Philologically exact and otherwise satisfactorily annotated translations of complete texts, rendered in relation to the historical conditions of the linguistic nature of these texts remains the primary demand for all study of intellectual history.

(2) The Western humanities have a long tradition of conceptual research. This tradition offers possibilities for utilizing the results of methodical discussions in the Western humanities for research on Japanese thought along the lines of historical-conceptual studies. If research in the field of intellectual history is ever to regard itself as science (*Wissenschaft*), it can no longer afford to leave the central

39. One might think here to some extent of the integration of *ikioi* in the dialectical-historical thought of Rai San'yō. Cf. Ulrich Goch, "Die Entstehung einer modernen Geschichtswissenschaft in Japan," *Bochumer Jahrbuch zur Ostasienforschung* 1 (1978):248f.

40. Here one might equally well cite other examples of intellectual directions such as those of Hayashi Razan (*Shunkan shō*), Kaibara Ekken (*Gojō kun*), or Nakamura Tekisai (*Kōgaku hikki*); see Ishida Ichirō, "Tokugawa hōken shakai to Shushigakuha no shisō," *Tōhoku daigaku bungakubu kenkyū nenpō* 13.2 (1963), with an English version in *The Philosophical Studies of Japan* 5 (1964). Particularly to be recommended are the studies of Ishige Tadashi dealing with the role of "Heaven" in political thought from the Nanboku era down to the Meiji Restoration, in *Nihon shisōshi kenkyū* Nos. 1, 2, 3; *Bunka shigaku*, No. 27; and *Nihon shisōshigaku*, No. 5.

concepts of the primary texts in their historical dimension in the dark. The compilation of a historical dictionary of the philosophical concepts of the indigenous Japanese tradition should be regarded as the long-term goal for the future.⁴¹

(3) The authors of this volume have given valuable examples of the general methodological prerequisites for writing intellectual history, using the results of recent theoretical discussions. These efforts will have to be continued. Attention will also have to be focused on the generation of a dialectical tension between European and Japanese conceptual notions. The hermeneutic innocence of concepts in the field of intellectual history⁴² in the dominance of a discourse which does not define the conditions of its own use of language ends up in a state of total chaos.⁴³

(4) A critical reconsideration of the historical conditions, particularly of Japanese *shisōshigaku*, from the aspect of cognition and interest (*Erkenntnis und Interesse*) represents an essential presupposition in the use of the accessible materials. The negative assessment of Sorai, in contrast to Jinsai, is especially revealing from the political point of view. A critical observer cannot avoid learning about the motivational conditions of his own judgment and that of others if he is to avoid the danger of creating or accepting positive or negative projections. But I do not want to argue against the importance of a politically engaged discussion on the subjects of our interest, which would have a significance of its own apart from actual analysis.

(5) Our methodical reservations concerning past research may in no way justify our ignorance of its results. Difficulties in observing this obligation which are, at times, visible in this volume, are, how-

41. Particularly notable for its methodological suggestions in this connection is the recently published work of Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, eds., *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, 1971 et sqq.). Especially useful is H. G. Meier, "Begriffsgeschichte," in *ibid.*, Vol. 1, columns 788-808. Also important is Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972 et sqq.), particularly its introduction. See also Reinhart Koselleck, ed., *Historische Semantik und Begriffsgeschichte* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979), for critical remarks on the methodology employed in the works cited.

42. See Irmela Hijiya-Kirschnereit, "Die nicht existenten Probleme der modernen japanischen Literaturgeschichtsschreibung," in *Referate* (cited noted 23 *supra*), p. 52.

43. See Katharina May, "Zur Problematik der Terminologie in der japanischen Literaturwissenschaft," *Bochumer Jahrbuch zur Ostasienforschung*, Vol. 2 (1979).

ever, partly due to the bibliographical conditions of working in the field of *shisōshi* research. While in the case of the Japanese research the given bibliographical aids can be valued as almost sufficient, it is the bibliographical access to materials in Western languages that leaves much to be desired.

(6) If the discussion is ever to be extended beyond a circle of specialists, more attention will have to be focused on the formal aspects of presentation. The lack of references to literature, the enumeration of unknown names (which specialist knows Inoue Kinga?) and undefined conceptions (*e.g.*, *chawanmushi* day, p. 29; *Ise kō*, p. 53; *kiki*, p. 92), and the sequences of untranslated Japanese quotes (*passim*) only make reading this book unnecessarily difficult for outsiders.⁴⁴

Are studies on Japanese thought really advancing on their way toward communicability? No matter what our answer to this question may be, we should recognize that the editors of this volume have courageously taken up this central problem and, together with their authors, pointed out possibilities. This is an important step, for which they deserve our thanks and respect.

44. Errors, including printing and transcription mistakes, that distort the meaning of the text (cited by page and line): x/38, also *passim*, Kaiho Seiryō; 24/5: Youemon; 30/29, *kokoro no naki mono*; 31/28: *me o hanashite*; 31/40: *karō*; 32/2: *naranu*; 37, note 9: Kinugasa Yasuki; note 15: *Nihon seiji shosōshi kenkyū* (1952); *Kaiho Seiryō shū*, ed. Tanimura Ichitarō; *Nihon hōken shisōshi kenkyū*; 50/1: *ōjōya*; 60, note 10: *jōkyō*; 61, note 28: *meicho*; note 33: *ranbōki*; note 37: Sakura Sōgorō; 62, note 59: *-gōri*; 69/32: *umwältzende*; 80/12, and *passim*: *Kodō tai-i*; 85/37: (finished 1798; published 1799); 91/24f.: Ame no minakanushi, Takamimusubi, and Kamumimusubi no kami; 97/20f.: *kami no musubi*; 102, note 23: (Harmondsworth 1973); note 40: Sagara Tōru; 103, note 53: Sandaikō; note 66: *Ibid.*, pp. 103–4; 141/17: *iu*; line 24: *bukyoku*; 138/19: Wittenbert; 146/30: *Tohimondō*; 153/26, and *passim*: (Western) Chou; 177, note 4: *Motoda Inoue ryō sensei jiseki kōen roku*; 178, note 19: Nakamura Yukihiro; 198, note 14: Takasu Yoshijirō; note 25: *gunsho*; 199, note 44: *Nihon meika shisho chūshaku zensho*; note 60: ed. Nakamura Yukihiro and Okada Takehiko; note 67: (Glencoe, Ill., 1957); note 71: ed. Naramoto Tatsuya and Nakai Nobuhiko; note 69: Tetsujirō. The above corrects the usage of the macron in transcriptions only in those instances where its incorrect employment has left the possibility of mistaking the sense of the word.